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Yizhou Zhao and Hua Sun
Abstract
We consider the secure computation problem in a minimal model, where Alice and Bob
each holds an input and wish to securely compute a function of their inputs at Carol without
revealing any additional information about the inputs. For this minimal secure computation
problem, we propose a novel coding scheme built from two steps. First, the function to be
computed is expanded such that it can be recovered while additional information might be
leaked. Second, a randomization step is applied to the expanded function such that the leaked
information is protected. We implement this expand-and-randomize coding scheme with two
algebraic structures - the finite field and the modulo ring of integers, where the expansion
step is realized with the addition operation and the randomization step is realized with the
multiplication operation over the respective algebraic structures.
Yizhou Zhao (email: yizhouzhao@my.unt.edu) and Hua Sun (email: hua.sun@unt.edu) are with the Department
of Electrical Engineering at the University of North Texas.
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic primitives are canonical and representative problems that capture the key challenges
in understanding the fundamentals of security and privacy, and are essential building blocks for
more sophisticated systems and protocols. There is much recent interest in using information
theoretic tools to tackle classical cryptographic primitives [1–7]. Along this line, the focus of this
work is on a widely studied primitive in cryptography - secure (multiparty) computation [8].
Secure computation refers to the problem where a number of users wish to securely compute a
function on their inputs without revealing any unnecessary information. Interestingly, challenging
as it seems, secure computation is always feasible, i.e., with at least three users, any function can
be computed securely in the information theoretic sense [9, 10]. However, what is largely open is
how to perform secure computation optimally, i.e., efficient secure computation solutions are not
known for most cases [6].
The main motivation of this work is to make progress towards constructing efficient secure com-
putation codes. Towards this end, we focus on a minimal model of secure computation, introduced
by Feige, Kilian, and Naor in 1994 [11]. In this model (see Fig. 1), there are three users - Alice, Bob,
and Carol. Alice and Bob have inputs W1 and W2, respectively and wish to compute a function
f(W1,W2) at Carol without revealing any additional information about their inputs beyond what
is revealed by the function itself. To do so, Alice and Bob share a common random variable Z
that is independent of the inputs and send codewords X1 and X2 to Carol, respectively. From
X1, X2, Carol can recover f(W1,W2) and conditioned on f(W1,W2), X1, X2 are independent of
W1,W2 so that no additional information is leaked. The key feature of this formulation is that the
communication protocol consists of only one codeword from each party that holds the input (thus
non-interactive) while for the general secure computation formulation [9, 10], interactive protocols
are allowed and typically used. Elemental as it seems, this minimal secure computation problem
preserves most challenging features of general secure computation; in particular, feasibility results
remain strong and optimality results remain weak, i.e., any function f can be computed securely
while efficient codes are mostly not available [11,12]. In this work we focus exclusively on the orig-
inal three-party formulation of minimal secure computation [11], but note that many interesting
variants have been studied (sometimes under different names to highlight different assumptions)
in the literature, e.g., more than three parties [13–15], colluding parties [16–19], other security
notions [20], and unresponsive parties [21].
Figure 1: The minimal secure computation problem [11].
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The main contribution of this work is a novel coding scheme that relies on algebraic structures
to ensure correctness and security. To illustrate the idea of our coding scheme, let us first consider
an example. Suppose Alice and Bob each holds a ternary input, W1,W2 ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and wish to
compute if W1 is equal to W2, i.e., f(W1,W2) = Yes if W1 = W2 and f(W1,W2) = No otherwise.
f 0 1 2
0 Yes No No
1 No Yes No
2 No No Yes
Expand−→
W1 −W2 0 1 2
0 0 2 1
1 1 0 2
2 2 1 0
Randomize−→
γ × (W1 −W2) 0 1 2
0 0 {1, 2} {1, 2}
1 {1, 2} 0 {1, 2}
2 {1, 2} {1, 2} 0
Figure 2: The expand-and-randomize coding scheme for the equal function. In the function table, each row
corresponds to a value of W1 and each column corresponds to a value of W2. When the function output is a
random variable, the set of possible values is shown in the table. The functions W1−W2 and γ× (W1−W2)
are computed over the finite field F3 and γ is uniform over the set {1, 2}.
As the equal function may not be easily computed in a secure manner, we first expand it to
a linear function so that it becomes simpler to deal with. As shown in Fig. 2, we use the linear
function W1 −W2 over the finite field F3 (equivalent to operations modulo 3). For this expansion,
we require that the original function can be fully recovered by the expanded function. This is
easily verified for this example, where W1 −W2 6= 0 if and only if W1 is not equal to W2. This
expansion step does not solve the secure computation problem because additional information may
be leaked. For example, here Carol should only know if W1 − W2 = 0 and is not supposed to
learn W1 −W2 is 1 or 2. To prevent this leakage, we invoke another step of randomization so that
the leaked information by the expanded function becomes confusable and thus protected. For this
equal function example, when W1−W2 6= 0, we wish to make the result equally likely to be 1 or 2.
This is realized by multiplying W1−W2 with γ, where γ is uniform over {1, 2}. The multiplication
operation is also over F3. Thus
when W1 −W2 = 1, γ × (W1 −W2) = γ is equally likely to be 1 or 2; (1)
when W1 −W2 = 2, γ × (W1 −W2) = γ × 2 is equally likely to be 1 or 2. (2)
Note that 2× 2 = 4 = 1 over F3. After this randomization step, the randomized expanded function
does not reveal any additional information beyond the original equal function. The above expand-
and-randomize procedure can be easily converted to a distributed secure computation protocol.
In particular, Alice and Bob share a common random variable, Z = (γ, z), where γ and z are
independent, γ is uniform over {1, 2}, and z is uniform over {0, 1, 2}. The codewords X1, X2 sent
by Alice and Bob to Carol are
X1 = γ ×W1 + z, (3)
X2 = γ ×W2 + z. (4)
To decode f(W1,W2) with no error, Carol subtracts X2 from X1, X1 −X2 = γ × (W1 −W2) and
claims that W1 is equal to W2 if and only if X1−X2 = 0. To see why perfect security holds, note that
(X1, X2) is invertible to (X1−X2, X2); both X1−X2 and X2 (protected by an independent uniform
noise z) do not leak any information. Specifically, the joint distributions of (X1, X2) remain the
same for all (W1,W2) pairs so that f(W1,W2) are the same. That is, when W1 is equal to W2, i.e.,
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(W1,W2) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 2)}, (X1, X2) are identically distributed (X1 is uniform over {0, 1, 2}
and X2 is equal to X1) and the same observation holds for all (W1,W2) pairs where W1 is not equal
to W2 (X1−X2 is uniform over {1, 2}; X2 is independent of X1−X2 and is uniform over {0, 1, 2}).
Interestingly, this secure computation code is also communication optimal, i.e., the size of X1 and
X2 must be no less than log2 3 bits each (required even if there is no security constraint).
A closer inspection of the above scheme reveals that the key is to find an expanded function
such that the expanded function outputs corresponding to the same original function output can
be randomized to be fully confusable. The first main result of this work is to characterize the
structural properties of such confusable sets over the finite field Fq, where q is a prime power.
The confusable function outputs turn out to be characterized by the property that their discrete
logarithms (in exponential representation of the finite field elements) have the same remainder in
modular arithmetic. Details will be presented in Section 3.1.
Remarkably, the expand-and-randomize coding scheme is not limited to the finite field. As our
second main result, we implement it over the ring of integers modulo n, Zn = {0, 1, · · · , n − 1}.
The ring is equipped with two operations, addition and multiplication, both defined in modulo n
arithmetic. Let us consider an example to illustrate how Zn is used. Consider the selected-switch
function in Fig. 3. Alice has a binary input, W1 ∈ {0, 1}. Bob has a ternary input, W2 ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
When W1 ≥W2, the switch function f is OFF and the output is 0 (we may think that the output
is not connected to the input, so it is a constant). When W1 < W2, the switch function f is ON
and the output is equal to the input vector (all information about W1,W2 goes through).
f 0 1 2
0 0 (0, 1) (0, 2)
1 0 0 (1, 2)
Expand−→
W˜1 + W˜2 0 2 5
4 4 0 3
2 2 4 1
Randomize−→
γ × (W˜1 + W˜2) 0 2 5
4 {2, 4} 0 3
2 {2, 4} {2, 4} {1, 5}
Figure 3: The expand-and-randomize coding scheme for the selected-switch function. The expanded function
W˜1 + W˜2 and the randomized expanded function γ× (W˜1− W˜2) are defined over the ring of integers modulo
6, Z6. γ is uniform over {1, 5}, the set of integers that are coprime with 6.
Following the expand-and-randomize coding paradigm, we first expand the original function
to the addition function over Z6 such that it can be fully recovered. Note that to facilitate the
construction of the expanded function, here we perform an invertible transformation on the inputs,
W1 → W˜1(0 → 4, 1 → 2),W2 → W˜2(0 → 0, 1 → 2, 2 → 5). The expanded function reveals more
information than allowed when the output is 2 or 4. To protect this information, a randomization
step is fulfilled by multiplying γ, which is uniform over {1, 5}. Now 2 × {1, 5} = {2, 10} = {2, 4}
modulo 6, and 4 × {1, 5} = {4, 20} = {2, 4} modulo 6. Therefore the expanded function after
randomization can be used to produce the following secure computation protocol. The codewords
are X1 = γ × W˜1 + z,X2 = γ × W˜2 − z, where Z = (γ, z), γ and z are independent, γ is uniform
over {1, 5}, and z is uniform over {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. To decode, Carol will compute X1 + X2 =
γ × (W˜1 + W˜2). Comparing the original function f and the randomized expanded function γ ×
(W˜1 + W˜2), it is not hard to construct the decoding rule based on X1 +X2 (see Fig. 3). Following
a straightforward argument as presented above, we may show that the correctness and security
constraints are satisfied. Details will be presented in Theorem 1.
From this example, we find that the crux of the scheme is a partition of the elements of Z6 into
several disjoint confusable sets such that when any two elements of a confusable set S are multiplied
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with γ which is uniform over a carefully chosen set (γ is referred to as the randomizer), they will
produce identically distributed sets of values; specifically, both will produce the confusable set S.
Z6 = {0} ∪ {1, 5} ∪ {2, 4} ∪ {3}, γ is uniform over {1, 5}; over Z6 :
1× {1, 5} = 5× {1, 5} = {1, 5}, 2× {1, 5} = 4× {1, 5} = {2, 4}, {3} × {1, 5} = {3}. (5)
The main technical challenge is to understand which sets of elements can serve as the randomizer γ
and how the ring Zn is partitioned into disjoint confusable sets such that security is guaranteed. For
this purpose, we require a few notions from group theory and number theory. Details are presented
in Section 3.2. To get a glimpse, consider the above example (see (5)), where the randomizer γ is
from the set of integers that are coprime with 6 (1 and 5 both have no common divisor with 6),
and the confusable sets are the sets of integers that have the same greatest common divisor with 6
(e.g., gcd(2, 6) = gcd(4, 6) = 2).
Our proposed coding scheme is inspired by two examples (binary logical AND function and
ternary comparison function) presented in Appendix A and Appendix B of the original minimal
secure computation paper [11], where modular arithmetic over a prime number p is used. Note
that the finite field Fp and the ring of integers modulo p, Zp both reduce to modular arithmetic for
a prime p. Along this line, our work can be viewed as a generalization of the examples from [11] to
a general class of achievable schemes that distill the underlying algebraic structure and work over
finite fields and modulo rings of integers with general (non-prime) cardinality.
2 Problem Statement
Consider a pair of inputs1 (W1,W2) ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m1 − 1} × {0, 1, · · · ,m2 − 1} and a function
f : {0, 1, · · · ,m1 − 1} × {0, 1, · · · ,m2 − 1} → {0, 1, · · · , |f |}. W1 is available to Alice and W2 is
available to Bob. Alice and Bob also both hold a common random variable Z whose distribution
does not depend on W1,W2.
Alice and Bob wish to compute f(W1,W2) securely. To this end, Alice sends a codeword X1
and Bob sends a codeword X2 to Carol. X1 is a function of W1 and Z, and has L1 bits
2. X2 is a
function of W2 and Z, and has L2 bits. The function f is known to Alice, Bob, and Carol.
From X1, X2, Carol can recover f(W1,W2) with no error. This is referred to as the correctness
constraint. To ensure Carol does not learn anything beyond f(W1,W2), the following security
constraint must be satisfied.
(Security) For any joint distribution of (W1,W2), I(X1, X2;W1,W2|f(W1,W2)) = 0. (6)
Equivalently, the security constraint can be stated as follows.
For any (W1,W2) pairs such that f(W1,W2) are equal, (X1, X2) are identically distributed. (7)
A rate tuple (L1, L2) is said to be achievable if there exists a secure computation scheme, for
which the correctness and security constraints are satisfied. The closure of the set of all achievable
rate tuples is called the optimal rate region.
1The main result of this work is a new achievable scheme for secure computation and the new scheme works for
any joint distribution of (W1,W2), so we do not specify explicitly this joint distribution. Further, for simplicity,
we introduce the problem statement as a scalar coding problem. Concrete distributions will be given and L-length
extensions (block inputs) will be considered when they play more significant roles in the results, e.g., when we discuss
-error schemes in Section 4.2 and converse results in Section 3.3.
2As our proposed code will have a fixed length, here we only define fixed-length codes, i.e., L1 does not depend
on the value of W1. In general, variable-length codes might have a lower expected length (see Remark 3).
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3 The Main Coding Scheme
In this section, we present a novel secure computation code that implements the expand-and-
randomize scheme over the finite field Fq and the ring of integers modulo n, Zn. Let us start with
relevant definitions.
Definition 1 (Confusable Sets and Randomizer) Sets S0,S1,S2, · · · are called confusable sets
if they form a partition of all elements from Fq or Zn and there exists a uniform random variable γ
over a set S∗ ⊂ Fq or Zn such that ∀s ∈ Si, γ × s is uniform3 over Si. γ is called the randomizer.
Definition 2 (Feasible Expanded Function) For a function f(W1,W2), a function f˜(W˜1, W˜2) =
W˜1+W˜2 over Fq or Zn is called a feasible expanded function if the mapping between W1 and W˜1, the
mapping between W2 and W˜2, and the mapping between f(W1,W2) and the index of the confusable
set to which f˜(W˜1, W˜2) belongs are all invertible.
For an example of a feasible expanded function (for the equal function with ternary inputs)
over F3, see Fig. 2. Specifically, F3 = {0, 1, 2} = S0 ∪ S1, where S0 = {0},S1 = {1, 2}. γ is uniform
over S∗ = {1, 2}. γ × 1 and γ × 2 are both uniformly distributed over S1. W˜1 = W1, W˜2 = −W2.
f is the equal function and f˜ is W1−W2. The Yes output of f is mapped to S0 over f˜ and the No
output of f is mapped to S1 over f˜ . For an example of a feasible expanded function over Z6, see
Fig. 3.
A feasible expanded function as defined above naturally leads to a correct and secure compu-
tation scheme, presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For any function f(W1,W2), if we have a feasible expanded function f˜(W˜1, W˜2) =
W˜1 + W˜2 over Fq or Zn, then the following computation code is both correct and secure.
X1 = γ × W˜1 + z,X2 = γ × W˜2 − z (8)
where Z = (z, γ), γ is the randomizer, z and γ are independent, and z is uniform over Fq or Zn.
Specifically, in this scheme, Alice and Bob each sends a symbol from Fq or Zn to Carol.
Proof: The proof of correctness and security follows in a straightforward manner from the
definitions of the confusable sets, the randomizer, and the feasible expanded function. First, we
consider the correctness constraint. To recover f(W1,W2) with no error, Carol may compute
X1 +X2 = γ × (W˜1 + W˜2), from which Carol can uniquely identify the index of the confusable set
(invertible to the original function output). Note that by the definition of the confusable sets and
the randomizer, multiplying with γ does not change the confusable set index. Second, we consider
the security constraint (7). Consider any (W1,W2) pairs that produce the same f(W1,W2) output,
and we show that (X1, X2) are identically distributed. To see this, note that (X1, X2) is invertible
to (X1+X2, X2) = (γ× (W˜1+W˜2), γ×W˜2−z). By the definition of the confusable sets, X1+X2 is
uniform over the confusable set that corresponds to f(W1,W2); and as γ and z are independent and
z is uniform, X2 is independent of X1 +X2 and is uniform over Fq or Zn. Therefore, (X1 +X2, X2)
are always uniform thus are identically distributed (so are (X1, X2)). The proof is complete.
3The requirement here is stronger than what is needed for security. It suffices to have identical (instead of uniform)
distributions over some disjoint set (instead of the confusable set). However, for our proposed scheme, it turns out
that these relaxations do not lead to improved achievable rate regions such that they are not considered for simplicity.
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The coding scheme in Theorem 1 relies on the structure of the confusable sets and the randomizer
upon which feasible expanded functions are built. Thus it is crucial to understand the structure of
the confusable sets and the randomizer, i.e., which set of elements can be used as the randomizer
and how the algebraic object is partitioned to confusable sets. This structure problem is addressed
next, through algebraic characterizations. The finite field case is considered in Section 3.1 and the
ring of integers modulo n case is considered in Section 3.2.
3.1 Finite field
We first recall some basic facts of finite fields (refer to standard textbooks such as [22]). A finite field
Fq exists only when q = pn, where p is a prime and n is a positive integer. Fq has q = pn elements.
Any two fields with pn elements are isomorphic, thus Fq is referred to as the finite field. The pn
elements of Fq are the polynomials a0+a1x+a2x2+ · · · an−1xn−1, where ai ∈ {0, 1, · · · , p−1},∀i ∈
{0, 1, · · · , n − 1}. The addition and multiplication operations over Fq are defined modulo h(x),
where h(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree n that always exists. The non-zero elements of
Fq form a multiplicative group, denoted as F×q . F×q is a cyclic group {1, g, g2, · · · , gq−2} that can
be generated by a primitive element g ∈ F×q . Denote g0 = 1.
Example 1 The finite field F23 can be constructed by addition and multiplication modulo h(x) =
x3+x+1. The multiplicative group F×
23
= {1, x, x+1, x2, x2+1, x2+x, x2+x+1} can be generated
by g = x.
g2 = x2, g3 = x3 mod (x3 + x+ 1) = x+ 1, g4 = x2 + x, (9)
g5 = x3 + x2 mod (x3 + x+ 1) = x2 + x+ 1, (10)
g6 = x3 + x2 + x mod (x3 + x+ 1) = x2 + 1, (11)
g7 = x3 + x mod (x3 + x+ 1) = 1 = g0. (12)
Equipped with the above results (in particular, the cyclic property of the multiplicative group
F×q ), we are ready to the state in the following theorem the algebraic characterization of the con-
fusable sets and the randomizer over Fq.
Theorem 2 For Fq where q = pn, p is a prime, n is an integer, and g is a primitive element of
F×q , the confusable sets and the randomizer can be chosen as follows. Consider any divisor d of
pn − 1, i.e., b = (pn − 1)/d is an integer.
γ is uniform over S∗ = {g0, gd, g2d, · · · , g(b−1)d}, (13)
Fq = S0 ∪ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ · · · ∪ Sd, (14)
S0 = {0},Si = {gi−1, gd+i−1, g2d+i−1, · · · , g(b−1)d+i−1}, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , d}. (15)
In words, the elements of a confusable set are such that their discrete logarithms have the same
remainder modulo a divisor of pn − 1.
Before we prove Theorem 2, let us first understand it through an example and use it to securely
compute a function.
Example 2 Consider F7 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. A primitive element of F×7 is 3. Setting d = 3, the
following confusable sets are given by Theorem 2.
S0 = {0},S1 = {30, 33} = {1, 27} mod 7 = {1, 6},S2 = {31, 34} = {3, 4},S3 = {32, 35} = {2, 5}.(16)
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Consider the function f(W1,W2) shown in Fig. 4, for which a feasible expanded function can be
built upon the confusable sets given above.
f 0 1 2
0 0 1 1
1 0 2 3
Expand−→
overF7
W˜1 + W˜2 2 3 4
0 2 3 4
3 5 6 0
Randomize−→
overF7
γ × (W˜1 + W˜2) 2 3 4
0 {2, 5} {3, 4} {3, 4}
3 {2, 5} {1, 6} {0}
Figure 4: An expand-and-randomize secure computation code over F7, where γ is uniform over {1, 6}.
Remark 1 While the primitive element g of F×q is guaranteed to exist, there is no analytic formula
for it and finding it computationally is extremely heavy in general. Further, given the polynomial
representation of g, it is generally non-trivial to determine the minimum field size q such that there
exists a feasible expanded function over Fq for a specific function f . A list of confusable sets for all
finite fields Fq, q < 20 is given in Fig. 9 (see the Appendix).
Proof of Theorem 2: We verify that the definition of the confusable sets is satisfied. The proof
is a simple consequence of modular arithmetic.
Obviously, S0,S1, · · · ,Sd form a partition of all elements from Fq. We only need to show that
∀s ∈ Si, i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d}, γ× s is uniform over Si. This is proved as follows. When i = 0, S0 = {0}
so that s = 0 and γ × s = {0} = S0. When i ∈ {1, · · · , d}, consider any element from Si, e.g.,
s = gjd+i−1, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , b− 1}. We have
γ × s = {g0, gd, g2d, · · · , g(b−1)d} × gjd+i−1 (17)
= {gjd+i−1, g(j+1)d+i−1, g(j+2)d+i−1, · · · , g(j+b−1)d+i−1} (18)
= {gi−1, gd+i−1, g2d+i−1, · · · , g(b−1)d+i−1} = Si (19)
where (19) follows from the fact that gbd = gp
n−1 = 1 and the observation that any b consecutive
integers form the same set under modulo b, i.e., {0, 1, · · · , b− 1} = {j, j + 1, · · · , j + b− 1} mod b.
As γ is uniform, γ × s is uniform (over Si) as well.
3.2 Ring of integers modulo n
To facilitate the presentation of the algebraic characterization of the confusable sets and the ran-
domizer over Zn, we first introduce some definitions and preliminary results.
Definition 3 (Set of Integers with Same gcd) Consider any proper divisor d of a given inte-
ger n, i.e., d < n and n/d is an integer. We denote by Z(d)n the set of integers in Zn so that their
greatest common divisors with n are d, i.e., Z(d)n = {a| gcd(a, n) = d}.
For example, suppose n = 15 = 3× 5, which has proper divisors 1, 3, 5. Then
Z(1)15 = {1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14},Z(3)15 = {3, 6, 9, 12},Z(5)15 = {5, 10}. (20)
Further, Z15 = {0, 1, · · · , 14} = {0} ∪ Z(1)15 ∪ Z(3)15 ∪ Z(5)15 . (21)
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The set Z(1)n has been extensively studied in abstract algebra (see e.g., [23]) and number theory (see
e.g., [24]), and is referred to as the multiplicative group of integers modulo n (it turns out to form
a group under multiplication modulo n), so we adopt the standard existing notation Z×n = Z
(1)
n .
Note that
Z(d)n = {a| gcd(a, n) = d} = d× {a| gcd(a, n/d) = 1} = d× Z×n/d. (22)
For example,
Z(3)15 = {3, 6, 9, 12} = 3× {1, 2, 3, 4} = 3× Z×5 , Z(5)15 = {5, 10} = 5× {1, 2} = 5× Z×3 . (23)
We present an important result on the projection of a multiplicative subgroup of Z×n over Z×d
in the following lemma. To differentiate set and multiset (where an element might appear several
times), we use the notation {¯H }¯ for a multiset H.
Lemma 1 Consider an arbitrary subgroup Gn of Z×n (under multiplication modulo n). When we
take Gn modulo d (where d is a divisor of n and d 6= 1), we have multiple copies of a subgroup of
Z×d (under multiplication modulo d), i.e., Gn mod d = {¯Gd, Gd, · · · , Gd}¯, where Gd is a subgroup
of Z×d .
The proof of Lemma 1 is presented in Section 3.4. Here for illustration, we give an example.
Example 3 Consider a subgroup G15 = {1, 11} of Z×15. We have G15 mod 3 = {1, 2} so that
G3 = {1, 2}, which is a subgroup of (in fact, equal to) Z×3 = {1, 2}. G15 mod 5 = {¯1, 1}¯, which is
two copies of G5 = {1}, and G5 is a (trivial) subgroup of Z×5 = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Consider another subgroup G15 = {1, 4, 11, 14} of Z×15 (note that G15 is closed under multiplica-
tion). G15 mod 3 = {¯1, 1, 2, 2}¯, which is two copies of G3 = {1, 2} = Z×3 . G15 mod 5 = {¯1, 4, 1, 4}¯,
which is two copies of G5 = {1, 4} and G5 is a subgroup of Z×5 = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Consider G15 = Z×15 = {1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14}. G15 mod 3 = {¯1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2}¯, which is
4 copies of G3 = {1, 2} = Z×3 . G15 mod 5 = {¯1, 2, 4, 2, 3, 1, 3, 4}¯, which is 2 copies of G5 =
{1, 2, 3, 4} = Z×5 .
Given a subgroup Gd of the group Z×d , we may partition Z
×
d into cosets (see e.g., Proposition 4
in Chapter 3 of [23] or Theorem 6.2 of [25]). Setting d as n/d, we have that Z×n/d may be partitioned
into cosets with Gn/d. Combining with (22), i.e., Z
(d)
n = d×Z×n/d, we may partition Z
(d)
n into cosets
with Gn/d. This partition is denoted by Z
(d)
n /Gn/d.
Example 4 Continuing from Example 3, consider a subgroup G15 = {1, 11} of Z×15. Then
Z×15/G15 = {1, 11} ∪ {2, 7} ∪ {4, 14} ∪ {8, 13} (24)
where the partition is obtained from the cosets, e.g., {2, 7} = 2 × {1, 11} = 7 × {1, 11} is a coset
of G15 with representative 2 ∈ Z×15 or 7 ∈ Z×15. Similarly, when G15 = {1, 11}, from Example 3 we
have G3 = {1, 2}, G5 = {1} and the partitions Z(5)15 /G3,Z(3)15 /G5 are as follows.
Z(5)15 /G3 = 5× {1, 2},
Z(3)15 /G5 = 3×
{{1} ∪ {2} ∪ {3} ∪ {4}}. (25)
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For another choice of G15 (again from Example 3), consider G15 = {1, 4, 11, 14} of Z×15. Then
from Example 3, G3 = {1, 2}, G5 = {1, 4}. The partitions are
d = 1 : Z×15/G15 = {1, 4, 11, 14} ∪ {2, 7, 8, 13},
d = 3 : Z(3)15 /G5 = 3×
{{1, 4} ∪ {2, 3}},
d = 5 : Z(5)15 /G3 = 5× {1, 2}. (26)
For the final choice of G15 = Z×15 from Example 3, we have G3 = Z
×
3 , G5 = Z
×
5 and the partitions
are trivial - Z×15/G15 = Z
×
15, Z
(3)
15 /G5 = 3× Z×5 , and Z(5)15 /G3 = 5× Z×3 .
The collection of the cosets Z(d)n /Gn/d for all proper divisors d is a feasible choice of the confus-
able sets. This result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 For Zn, the confusable sets and the randomizer can be chosen as follows. Consider
the set of all proper divisors of n, {d1 = 1, d2, · · · , db} and an arbitrary subgroup Gn of Z×n .
γ is uniform over S∗ = Gn, (27)
Zn = S0 ∪ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ · · · = {0} ∪ Z×n /Gn ∪ Z(d2)n /Gn/d2 ∪ · · · ∪ Z(db)n /Gn/db . (28)
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 3, we first give an example to illustrate its meaning.
Example 5 Continuing from Example 4, consider a subgroup G15 = {1, 11} of Z×15. Then from
Theorem 3, the confusable sets are
Z15 = {0} ∪ Z×15/G15 ∪ Z(3)15 /G5 ∪ Z(5)15 /G3 (29)
(24)(25)
= {0} ∪ {1, 11} ∪ {2, 7} ∪ {4, 14} ∪ {8, 13} ∪ {3} ∪ {6} ∪ {9} ∪ {12} ∪ {5, 10}. (30)
For each of the confusable set above, it is easy to verify that when an element is multiplied with γ
(uniform over G15), the result is uniform over the confusable set.
{2, 7} = γ × 2 = γ × 7, {5, 10} = γ × 5 = γ × 10, γ × 3 = {1, 11} × 3 = {¯3, 3}¯. (31)
For another example, consider G15 = {1, 4, 11, 14}. The confusable sets are
Z15 = {0} ∪ Z×15/G15 ∪ Z(3)15 /G5 ∪ Z(5)15 /G3 (32)
(26)
= {0} ∪ {1, 4, 11, 14} ∪ {2, 7, 8, 13} ∪ {3, 12} ∪ {6, 9} ∪ {5, 10}. (33)
Let us also verify that the uniform property holds. γ is over G15 = {1, 4, 11, 14}. For example,
consider 7 ∈ {2, 7, 8, 13}, then we have γ × 7 = {7, 28, 77, 98} mod 15 = {7, 13, 2, 8}. Consider
12 ∈ {3, 12}, then we have γ × 12 = {¯12, 48, 132, 168}¯ mod 15 = {¯12, 3, 12, 3}¯, which is 2 copies of
{3, 12}.
Finally, consider G15 = Z×15. The confusable sets are Z15 = {0} ∪ Z×15 ∪ Z(3)15 ∪ Z(5)15 . For
any element in Z(3)15 , say 6, we have γ × 6 = Z×15 × 6 = {6, 12, 24, 42, 48, 66, 78, 84} mod 15 =
{¯6, 12, 9, 12, 3, 6, 3, 9}¯, which is 2 copies of Z(3)15 .
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Proof of Theorem 3: The proof relies on Lemma 1 and the property of cosets. First, the
confusable sets form a partition of Zn. Second, we verify the uniform property, i.e., ∀s ∈ Si, γ×s is
uniform over Si. Consider any Si, e.g., a set from Z(di)n /Gn/di , i ∈ {1, · · · , b}. From the construction
of Si, we have Si × 1/di is a coset of Gn/di in Z×n/di . By the definition of cosets and the fact that
s/di ∈ Si × 1/di, we have
Si × 1/di = Gn/di × s/di. (34)
Next, consider
(Gn × s/di) mod n/di =
(
(Gn mod n/di)× s/di
)
mod n/di (35)
Lemma 1
=
({¯Gn/di , · · · , Gn/di }¯ × s/di) mod n/di (36)
(34)
= {¯Si × 1/di, · · · ,Si × 1/di}¯ mod n/di (37)
⇒ γ × s = Gn × s = di × (Gn × s/di) (38)
(37)
= {¯Si, · · · ,Si}¯. (39)
Therefore γ × s is uniform over Si. The proof is complete.
Remark 2 From Theorem 3, we see that any subgroup of Z×n can induce a feasible choice of the
confusable sets and the randomizer. We list all possible confusable sets for Zn, n < 20 in Fig. 10
(see the Appendix). We also include in the Appendix some discussion on the structures of the
subgroups of Z×n , based on existing group theory and number theory results.
3.3 Converse
One of the challenges to understand the optimality of secure computation codes is the lack of
converse results. As a starting point, we compare our achievable scheme with existing converse
results with no security constraint (i.e., the pure computation problem). Interestingly, when the
size of the underlying field or ring is the same as the input size, the scheme in Theorem 1 achieves
the information theoretically optimal rate region. Without loss of generality, for secure computation
problems, we assume there are no identical rows or columns in the function table (as Carol cannot
learn anything about the exact row or column index of such identical rows and columns).
Proposition 1 Consider independent and uniform inputs, i.e., W1,W2 are independent and uni-
form over {0, 1, · · · ,m−1}. For a function f(W1,W2), if a feasible expanded function exists over Fq
or Zn where q = m or n = m, then the scheme in Theorem 1 is information theoretically optimal.
Achievability directly follows from Theorem 1 and converse (H(X1), H(X2) ≥ log2m) follows
from a simple observation that when there is no security constraint, Alice (Bob) needs to tell Carol
the exact value of W1 (W2). The reason is that otherwise two W1(W2) will be mapped to the
same codeword X1(X2) and f(W1,W2) has no identical rows or columns such that some value of
f(W1,W2) cannot be decoded correctly. This (and more general) result has been proved in several
different contexts in the literature, see e.g., the classical function computation of correlated sources
work by Han and Kobayashi [26] (Lemma 1) and the recent generalization [27], the computation over
multiple access channel work [28] (Lemma 1), and the network coding for computing work [29,30].
Note that the converse holds for block inputs as well, where the rate is defined as the number of
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bits in the codeword per input symbol. As eliminating the security constraint cannot help, the
same converse holds for the secure computation problem as well.
Note that Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal rate region for a class of secure computation
problems (which contain infinite instances). One could start from the confusable sets of Fq or Zn
and invert them into a function f(W1,W2) with input size m = q or n. Functions constructed from
this method satisfy Proposition 1 and thus we obtain the optimal rate region.
To the best of our knowledge, the only existing information theoretic converse results for the
secure computation problem are the ones obtained in [6], whose expression involves common in-
formation terms and an optimization over a class of distributions so that the exact bound needs
to be evaluated for each individual instance and is generally not trivial to compute. Interestingly,
for some small instances, we find that our achievable scheme is information theoretically optimal
(see Remark 3 of Example 6 and Remark 4 of Example 7). For most cases, however, there is a gap
in the rate region between the achievable scheme in Theorem 1 and the converse results4 from [6]
while it is not clear if and by how much the scheme and the converse can be improved. We note
that there are instances where we know better schemes than that in Theorem 1 (see Example 9
and Example 10 in the discussion section).
3.4 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of Lemma 1 consists of two parts.
First, we show that the set of elements of Gn mod d, Gd, forms a subgroup of Z×d . This is
proved by two claims - (1) Gd ⊂ Z×d , and (2) Gd is closed under multiplication modulo d. Note
that for finite groups, the verification of subgroups only requires the check of the closure property
(i.e., associativity and the existence of identity and inverse elements are automatically guaranteed.
Refer to Proposition 1 in Chapter 2 of [23]).
For (1), note that any element g of Gn belongs to Z×n , so gcd(g, n) = 1. As d is a divisor of n,
we have gcd(g, d) = 1 and gcd(g mod d, d) = 1. Thus g mod d of Gd belongs to Z×d and Gd ⊂ Z×d .
For (2), consider any two elements of Gd, e.g., g1, g2 ∈ Gn and g1 mod d, g2 mod d ∈ Gd. As
Gn forms a group, we have for some g3 ∈ Gn, (g1 × g2) mod n = g3, i.e., g1 × g2 = k × n + g3 for
some integer k. Then(
(g1 mod d)× (g2 mod d)
)
mod d = (g1 × g2) mod d (40)
= (k × n+ g3) mod d (41)
= g3 mod d (d is a divisor of n) (42)
∈ Gd (43)
Therefore Gd is closed under multiplication.
Second, we show that in the multiset Gn mod d, each element of Gd appears for the same
number of times. Denote Gn = {g1, g2, · · · , gT }. As Gn is a subgroup of Z×n , we have
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , T}, (Gn × gi) mod n = {g1 × gi, g2 × gi, · · · , gT × gi} mod n = Gn. (44)
Denote the multiset G¯d = Gn mod d = {¯h1, · · · , h1, h2, · · · , hQ}¯, where hq, q ∈ {1, · · · , Q} appears
|hq| times and ∀q1 6= q2, hq1 6= hq2 . Assume without loss of generality that |h1| ≥ |h2| ≥ · · · |hQ|.
We need to show that |h1| = |hQ|. This proof is presented next.
4The model considered in [6] is the general secure computation problem that allows interactive multi-round
protocols. So the converse results therein might be generally too strong for the minimal secure computation problem.
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From the first part of the proof, we know that Gd = {h1, h2, · · · , hQ} is a subgroup of Z×d .
Applying (44) to Gd and Z×d , we have
∀j ∈ {1, · · · , Q}, (Gd × hj) mod d = {h1 × hj , h2 × hj , · · · , hQ × hj} mod d = Gd. (45)
Further, setting j = 1 in (45), we have
(Gd × h1) mod d = {h1 × h1, h2 × h1, · · · , hQ × h1} mod d = Gd = {h1, · · · , hQ}. (46)
Note that multiplication mod d is commutative. Then there exists j∗ ∈ {1, · · · , Q} such that
(hj∗ × h1) mod d = (h1 × hj∗) mod d = hQ. (47)
As hj∗ ∈ Gd, there exists i∗ ∈ {1, · · · , T} such that
gi∗ mod d = hj∗ . (48)
On the one hand,
(G¯d × hj∗) mod d = {¯h1 × hj∗ , · · · , h1 × hj∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
|h1| times
, h2 × hj∗ , · · · , hQ × hj∗ }¯ mod d (49)
(47)(45)
= {¯hQ, · · · , hQ︸ ︷︷ ︸
|h1| times
, h1, · · · , hQ−1}¯ (50)
On the other hand,
(G¯d × hj∗) mod d (48)= (G¯d × gi∗) mod d =
(
(Gn mod d)× gi∗
)
mod d (51)
= (Gn × gi∗) mod d (52)
(44)
= Gn mod d (53)
= G¯d = {¯h1, · · · , hQ−1, hQ, · · · , hQ︸ ︷︷ ︸
|hQ| times
}¯ (54)
Comparing (50) and (54) (i.e., the number of times that hQ appears), we have proved that
|h1| = |hQ|. The proof of the second part, and thus the proof of the lemma, are now complete.
4 Generalization
In this section, we consider several generalizations of the coding scheme presented in the previous
section, to illustrate how the insights generalize beyond the basic setting.
4.1 Optimized additive randomness
In the coding scheme presented in Theorem 1, the additive common randomness z appeared in the
codewords X1, X2 is uniform over Fq or Zn (refer to (8)), which is not necessary but a universal
and convenient choice that works for all cases and admits a simple proof. We show, through the
following example, that an optimized z (which does not have full-support over Zn) might help to
further reduce the communication cost.
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Example 6 Consider the function f(W1,W2) shown in Fig. 5, where a feasible expanded function
over Z4 is also depicted. The confusable sets are obtained from Theorem 3 using G4 = Z×4 = {1, 3}.
Z×4 = {0} ∪ {1, 3} ∪ {2}, γ is uniform over G4 = {1, 3}. (55)
From Theorem 1, Alice will send X1 = γ × W˜1 + z and Bob will send X2 = γ × W˜2 − z to Carol,
where γ is uniform over {1, 3}, z is uniform over Z4 = {0, 1, 2, 3}, and γ, z are independent. That
is, Alice and Bob each sends a symbols from Z4 (i.e., 2 bits) to Carol.
f 0 1
0 2 2
1 0 1
Expand−→
overZ4
W˜1 + W˜2 0 2
1 1 3
0 0 2
Randomize−→
overZ4
γ × (W˜1 + W˜2) 0 2
1 {1, 3} {1, 3}
0 0 2
Figure 5: An expand-and-randomize secure computation code over Z4, where γ is uniform over {1, 3}.
Interestingly, if we choose z to be uniform over {0, 2} (instead of uniform over {0, 1, 2, 3}), the
scheme will also work. Correctness remains the same and for security, we only need (X1, X2) (or
equivalently (X1, X1 +X2)) to be identically distributed when (W1,W2) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1)}. Note that
(W1,W2) = (0, 0)→ (W˜1, W˜2) = (1, 0)→ (X1, X1 +X2) = (γ + z, γ),
(W1,W2) = (0, 1)→ (W˜1, W˜2) = (1, 2)→ (X1, X1 +X2) = (γ + z, γ × 3). (56)
When γ is uniform over {1, 3}, and z is independent of γ and uniform over {0, 2}, we have that
both (γ+ z, γ) and (γ+ z, γ×3) are uniform over {(1, 1), (3, 1), (3, 3), (1, 3)}. Therefore the scheme
satisfies the security constraint. Importantly, now X2 = γ × W˜2 − z can only take value 0 or 2.
Therefore Bob only needs to send 1 bit (instead of 2 bits) to Carol.
Remark 3 If variable-length codes are allowed, then the above code can be further improved. Specif-
ically, Alice does not need to distinguish X1 is 1 or 3, e.g., Alice may simply send 1 when X1 is 1 or
3 (this happens when W˜1 = 1). Interestingly, the rate region of this code coincides with an existing
converse result from Theorem 9 of [6] for any joint distribution of (W1,W2) with full support. Thus
this improved code with optimized additive randomness and variable-length codewords tuns out to
be information theoretically optimal (i.e., even if block codes are allowed). We also note that an
alternative optimal code construction based on a different idea is presented in [6] (see Algorithm 3).
For a general given function f(W1,W2), to find the optimal choice of z, we may list all identically
distributed conditions in the security constraint (such as (56)) and solve for the z variable that
satisfies all the constraints and has minimum entropy (a uniform full-support z will always work
but has maximum entropy).
4.2 -error schemes with block codes
Hitherto we have focused exclusively on scalar codes and zero-error schemes that work for any
joint distribution of (W1,W2). In this subsection, we show how to use classical source coding
techniques (specifically, structured linear codes, or Korner-Marton coding [31]) that exploit the
specific distribution of (W1,W2) to improve the communication rate when long block codes and
vanishing-error are allowed. This is explained through the following binary AND function example.
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Example 7 Consider the binary AND function f(W1,W2) = W1 AND W2, for which a feasible
expanded function over F3 is shown in Fig. 6. The confusable sets are obtained from Theorem 2
using the primitive element g = 2 of F×3 and the divisor d = 1.
F3 = {0} ∪ {20, 21} = {0} ∪ {1, 2}, γ is uniform over {1, 2}. (57)
Then from Theorem 1, we set X1 = γ × W˜1 + z, X2 = γ × W˜2 − z so that it suffices to send
a symbol from F3 (i.e., log2 3 bits) each from Alice and Bob to Carol. In other words, the rate
tuple (log2 3, log2 3) is achievable. As mentioned in the introduction, this zero-error scalar code
first appeared in Appendix B of [11].
f 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
Expand−→
overF3
W˜1 + W˜2 1 2
0 1 2
1 2 0
Randomize−→
overF3
γ × (W˜1 + W˜2) 1 2
0 {1, 2} {1, 2}
1 {1, 2} 0
Figure 6: An expand-and-randomize secure computation code (for the binary AND function) over F3, where
γ is uniform over {1, 2}.
We note that for correct decoding, Carol will compute X1 +X2 = γ× (W˜1 + W˜2), denoted by U .
As our goal is only to recover U (securely of course), the amount of information required is simply
the entropy of U (which is smaller than log2 3 bits as long as it is not uniform). The only caveat
is that encoding is done in a distributed manner at Alice and Bob respectively, so we just need to
compress U with a linear code such that it is compatible with the decoding procedure of X1 + X2.
Fortunately, this distributed source compression for sum computation problem has been studied in
network information theory. In particular, structured linear codes apply and we will use (the secure
version of) Korner-Marton coding [31].
The improvement of the communication rate comes from the observation that in our proposed
code, we consider the worst case, i.e., U is not compressed and a symbol from F3 is sent to represent
X1 regardless of the distribution of U , the variable we wish to recover. When U is not uniform,
further compression over long blocks is possible. As a simple example, suppose W1 and W2 are
two independent uniform binary variables. As a result, U = X1 + X2 = γ × (W˜1 + W˜2) is 0 with
probability 1/4, is 1 with probability 3/8, and is 2 with probability 3/8 (see Fig. 6) and the entropy
of U is
H(U) = H
(
1
4
,
3
8
,
3
8
)
=
1
4
(11 log3 2− 3) < 1 in 3-ary units. (58)
Next, we outline how to use structured linear source codes to achieve the rate tuple (R1, R2) =
(H(U) log2 3, H(U) log2 3) bits per input symbol over long block-length with vanishing probability of
error. Consider L-length extension of the two inputs W1,W2, denoted by ~W1, ~W2, i.e., ~W1, ~W2 are
two sequences of i.i.d. uniform bits of length L. A similar vector notation is used for L-length
extensions of other variables, e.g., ~z represents a length L sequence of i.i.d. uniform symbols over
F3. We apply our proposed scheme to each5 bit of the input sequence and then multiply (over F3)
5Further optimizations of the common randomness consumption are possible, i.e., the same randomizer can be
used for each input bit and it suffices to use an additive common randomness variable with entropy LH(U) log2 3
bits (instead of L log2 3 bits).
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the vector codeword with a matrix A of size (H(U) + )L× L.
~X1 = A(H(U)+)L×L · (~γL×1 × ~˜W1︸︷︷︸
L×1
+~zL×1), ~X2 = A(H(U)+)L×L · (~γ × ~˜W2 − ~z) (59)
⇒ ~X1 + ~X2 = A(H(U)+)L×L · (~γ × ( ~˜W1 + ~˜W2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
,~U
= A(H(U)+)L×L · ~U (60)
where the ‘+’ and ‘×’ operators are symbol-wise, and the ‘·’ operator is the matrix multiplication
operator. Note that the same matrix A must be used by both Alice and Bob. We need to ensure
that from A(H(U)+)L×L · ~U , we can recover ~U . In other words, we now have the well-known point-
to-point source coding problem with a linear compressor. Thus there exists a deterministic matrix
A of size (H(U) + )L × L such that we can recover ~U from A · ~U with  probability of error and
 → 0 when L → ∞. Specifically, a random generation of A (i.e., choosing each element of A
independently and uniformly over F3) will work with high probability. The structured linear coding
technique has appeared in the literature many times, e.g., it was introduced by Elias in the context
of channel coding over a binary symmetric channel [32], was used by Wyner in the context of
distributed source coding of binary sources (the Slepian-Wolf problem, see Section VI. C of [33]),
was used by Korner and Marton in the context of encoding module-two sum of binary sources [31],
and generalizations to finite fields are immediate (see e.g., [34] and Remark 10.2 of [35]).
The security constraint is easily verified. The scalar code is secure by Theorem 1. Then in-
dependent application of the scalar code to L-length extensions is also secure. Multiplying with a
deterministic matrix A will not leak any information.
From Theorem 1, I(γ × W˜1 + z, γ × W˜2 − z;W1,W2|W1 AND W2) = 0 (61)
product distribution
=⇒ I(~γ × ~˜W1 + ~z,~γ × ~˜W2 − ~z; ~W1, ~W2| ~W1 AND ~W2) = 0 (62)
deterministic A
=⇒ I(A · (~γ × ~˜W1 + ~z), A · (~γ × ~˜W2 − ~z); ~W1, ~W2| ~W1 AND ~W2) = 0. (63)
Therefore the optimized block code has vanishing probability of error and is secure. The achieved
rate tuple is (H(U) log2 3, H(U) log2 3) bits for the codewords per input bit.
Finally, we note that the idea of using Korner-Marton coding for secure computation is not
new, e.g., it has been applied to secure sum computations [6, 36]. While our objective is not sum
computation, Korner-Marton coding still applies because the decoding procedure X1 +X2 relies on
a linear operation.
Remark 4 Interestingly, the zero-error code presented above for AND computation is information
theoretically optimal in terms of the communication rate (refer to Theorem 11 of [6]). That is,
communicating log2 3 bits per input bit from Alice and Bob each to Carol is the minimum possible.
Note that as -error codes achieve an improved rate performance than the best of that of zero-error
codes, we know that for secure computation problems, -error capacity may be different from zero-
error capacity (this fact has been established in prior work [6,36]). We also note that when -error
is allowed, the optimal rate region for AND computation remains open.
The above linear compression technique applies to all secure computation codes over Fq (refer
to Theorem 2), i.e., instead of sending a symbol from Fq, we may compress it to H(U) log2 q bits.
However, we note that the same result does not hold for codes over Zn when n is not a prime.
While the same linear compression technique can be applied, the rate performance is not known.
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That is, it is not known how large the matrix A needs to be, if we wish to recover ~U from A · ~U .
In particular, H(U) may not suffice (we need to understand more on the open problem of source
coding with restricted encoding structures, e.g., modular arithmetic. For related results on source
coding with group codes, see e.g., [37, 38] and references therein).
4.3 Equal function with non-prime-power inputs
In this subsection, we continue the discussion on the equal function in the introduction. We
consider the equation function with arbitrary input size, i.e., W1,W2 ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,m − 1} for an
arbitrary integer m and wish to securely compute if W1 is equal to W2. The approach taken in
the introduction works when m is a prime power pn such that there exist an invertible mapping
between {0, 1, · · · , pn − 1} and the elements from the finite field Fpn (say W1(W2) is mapped to
W˜1(W˜2)). Then W˜1 − W˜2 is a feasible expanded function where the zero element and the non-zero
elements are two confusable sets. Now what if m is not a prime power? We may increase m to
a prime power and then use the previous approach. This approach will require that Alice and
Bob each sends a symbol of size larger than log2m bits. Interestingly, we show that log2m bits
are always sufficient for any m (no matter m is a prime power or not). To this end, we need to
use a variant of the expand-and-randomize scheme from Theorem 1. To illustrate the idea, in the
following we consider the simplest example where m is not a prime power, i.e., m = 6.
Example 8 Consider W1,W2 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 5}. f(W1,W2) = Yes if W1 is equal to W2 and otherwise
f(W1,W2) = No. While 6 is not a prime power, we may decompose it into products of prime powers,
i.e., 6 = 2×3. The following scheme works by using a product of our expand-and-randomize schemes
over decomposed domains with uniformly permuted inputs.
Alice and Bob share a common random variable Z = (pi, γ1, γ2, z1, z2), where all the random
variables are independent and uniform, pi is from the set of all possible permutations with 6 elements,
γ1 is from F×2 = {1}, z1 is from F2 = {0, 1}, γ2 is from F×3 = {1, 2}, and z2 is from F3 = {0, 1, 2}.
The codewords are
X1 = (a1, a2), where a1
F2= γ1 × (pi(W1) mod 2) + z1, a2 F3= γ2 × (pi(W1) mod 3) + z2; (64)
X2 = (b1, b2), where b1
F2= γ1 × (pi(W2) mod 2) + z1, b2 F3= γ2 × (pi(W2) mod 3) + z2. (65)
The ‘+’ and ‘×’ operations in computing a1, b1(a2, b2) are over F2(F3). Note that the same permu-
tation pi is applied to W1 and W2. The decoding rule of Carol is as follows.
Carol claims W1 is equal to W2 if and only if (a1, a2) = (b1, b2). (66)
We have zero error because pi(W1) = pi(W2) if and only if (pi(W1) mod 2, pi(W1) mod 3) =
(pi(W2) mod 2, pi(W2) mod 3) (this result is typically referred to as the Chinese Remainder The-
orem). Next we verify that the security constraint is satisfied, i.e., when W1 is not equal to W2,
X1, X2 are identically distributed. Consider any (W1,W2) such that W1 6= W2 and pi(W1) 6=
pi(W2). Note that (X1, X2) is invertible to (a1, a2, b1 − a1, b2 − a2), and the 3 variables a1, a2, (b1 −
a1, b2 − a2) are independent. Further, a1 is uniform over {0, 1}, a2 is uniform over {0, 1, 2}, and
(pi(W1), pi(W2)) is uniform over (i, j), i 6= j, i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} so that
Pr
(
pi(W1) mod 2 = pi(W2) mod 2, pi(W1) mod 3 6= pi(W2) mod 3
)
= 2/5, (67)
Pr
(
pi(W1) mod 2 6= pi(W2) mod 2, pi(W1) mod 3 = pi(W2) mod 3
)
= 1/5, (68)
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Pr
(
pi(W1) mod 2 6= pi(W2) mod 2, pi(W1) mod 3 6= pi(W2) mod 3
)
= 2/5 (69)
⇒ (b1 − a1, b2 − a2) is uniform over {(0, 1), (0, 2), (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2)}. (70)
So security is guaranteed and sending 1 + log2 3 = log2 6 bits from Alice and Bob to Carol each is
sufficient.
Remark 5 The above scheme generalizes in a straightforward manner to any integer m using a
prime-power decomposition of m (this result is typically referred to as the fundamental theorem of
arithmetic). As the achieved communication rate log2m bits for Alice and Bob each matches the
optimal rate for independent and uniform inputs with no security constraint (see Proposition 1),
the above secure computation scheme achieves the information theoretically optimal rate region.
5 Discussion
We introduce the expand-and-randomize scheme for the secure computation problem and implement
it over the finite field and the ring of integers modulo n. We characterize the algebraic structures
of the feasible expanded functions through the notion of confusable sets. We find it interesting
that while we consider only information theoretic security, the tools invoked from algebra and
number theory arise frequently and lie in the core of cryptography under computational security
(see textbooks, e.g., [39, 40]). The proposed scheme is very efficient and sometimes optimal when
the original function is (close to) an isomorphism of such confusable sets. However, we are also
aware of functions where there exist better schemes such that our scheme is strictly sub-optimal.
In the following, we present two such examples to expose more diverse insights for the challenging
open problem - minimal secure computation.
Sub-optimal Examples
Example 9 Consider the function shown in Fig. 7. A feasible expanded function over F7 is also
depicted. The confusable sets are obtained from Theorem 2 using the primitive element g = 3 of
F×7 and the divisor d = 2.
F7 = {0} ∪ {30, 32, 34} ∪ {31, 33, 35} = {0} ∪ {1, 2, 4} ∪ {3, 5, 6}, γ is uniform over {1, 2, 4}. (71)
Therefore, according to Theorem 1, it suffices to send a symbol from F7 (i.e., log2(7) bits) each
from Alice and Bob to Carol. In other words, the rate tuple (log2(7), log2(7)) is achievable.
f 0 1 2
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1
Expand−→
overF7
W˜1 + W˜2 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
3 4 5 6
Randomize−→
overF7
γ × (W˜1 + W˜2) 1 2 3
0 {1, 2, 4} {1, 2, 4} {3, 5, 6}
3 {1, 2, 4} {3, 5, 6} {3, 5, 6}
Figure 7: An expand-and-randomize secure computation code over F7, where γ is uniform over {1, 2, 4}.
However, an improved rate tuple (2, 2) is achievable using a different coding scheme. Specifically,
we use the coding scheme from Section 2 of [11]. The scheme (when applied to this example) is
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described as follows. The common random variable shared is Z = (pi, z1, z2), where pi, z1, z2 are
independent and uniform binary random variables. The codewords are
X1 =

(1, z1) when pi = 0,W1 = 0
(2, z2) when pi = 0,W1 = 1
(2, z1) when pi = 1,W1 = 0
(1, z2) when pi = 1,W1 = 1
, X2 =
{
(f(0,W2) + z1, f(1,W2) + z2) when pi = 0
(f(1,W2) + z2, f(0,W2) + z1) when pi = 1
(72)
where X1 and X2 each contains 2 bits. The coding idea is that the first (second) row of the function
table is protected by the uniform noise z1 (z2). Bob does not know the value of W1, so he will send
both f(0,W2) and f(1,W2) (after masked by zi) in a random order. Alice will use the first element
of X1 to indicate if the first or the second element of X2 contains the desired function and use the
second element to carry the noise that masks the desired function output. So the decoding rule is as
follows. Denote X1 = (a1, a2) and X2 = (b1, b2). Carol can recover f(W1,W2) with no error from
ba1 − a2. Security is guaranteed by the observation that Carol only knows the noise that masks the
desired function while obtains nothing else. Therefore in this scheme, sending 2 < log2 7 bits each
by Alice and Bob is sufficient.
Example 10 Consider the function shown in Fig. 8. A feasible expanded function over Z8 is also
depicted. The confusable sets are obtained from Theorem 3 using the subgroup G8 = {1, 3} of
Z×8 = {1, 3, 5, 7}.
Z8 = {0} ∪ {1, 3} ∪ {5, 7} ∪ {2, 6} ∪ {4}, γ is uniform over G8 = {1, 3}. (73)
Therefore, according to Theorem 1, it suffices to send a symbol from Z8 (i.e., 3 bits) each from
Alice and Bob to Carol. In other words, the rate tuple (3, 3) is achievable.
f 0 1 2
0 0 0 1
1 2 3 4
Expand−→
overZ8
W˜1 + W˜2 0 2 6
1 1 3 7
2 2 4 0
Randomize−→
overZ8
γ × (W˜1 + W˜2) 0 2 6
1 {1, 3} {1, 3} {5, 7}
2 {2, 6} 4 0
Figure 8: An expand-and-randomize secure computation code over Z8, where γ is uniform over {1, 3}.
However, an improved rate tuple is achievable using a different coding scheme. To see this, we
assume that W1,W2 are independent and each of them is uniform over its support (note that the
scheme above does not depend on the joint distribution of (W1,W2)). We now describe a scheme
that achieves the rate tuple (2, log2 3), which is strictly better than (3, 3). This scheme is inspired
by Algorithm 3 of [6], which is for the function in Example 6 and we generalize it to the function in
Fig. 8. Alice and Bob share the common random variable Z = (z, z′), where z, z′ are independent
uniform binary random variables. The codewords sent are
X1 =
{
W1, z
′ when W1 = 0
W1, z when W1 = 1
, X2 =
{
(W2 + z)F2 when W2 ∈ {0, 1}
2 when W2 = 2
(74)
where X1 contains
6 2 bits and X2 contains log2 3 bits. An important feature of this function is that
from f(W1,W2), we can always recover W1. So W1 is always sent from Alice. Further, W2 should
6Obviously z′ is useless and it appears here to produce a fixed-length code.
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be protected when W2 ∈ {0, 1} and W1 = 0. So W2 is protected by a uniform noise z and when
it should be revealed (i.e., when W1 = 1), Alice will send the noise z; otherwise when it should be
protected, Alice will send an independent (thus useless) noise z′. After the coding idea is explained,
the decoding rule is now obvious. Carol will first check the value of W1 (sent from Alice). If W1 = 0,
Carol will claim f = 0 if X2 ∈ {0, 1} and f = 1 if X2 = 2. If W1 = 1, Carol will claim f = 4
if X2 = 2 and otherwise if X2 ∈ {0, 1}, Carol will use z to recover W2 and based on (W1,W2), f
is decoded with no error. Security is guaranteed because when (W1,W2) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1)}, for both
cases we have that X1, X2 are independent, in X1 = (W1, z
′), W1 is fixed to 0, z′ is uniform and
X2 = W2 + z is also uniform. Therefore, using this improved scheme, it suffices to send 2 < 3 bits
by Alice and log2 3 < 3 bits by Bob, respectively.
Going forward, while the characterization of the algebraic structures of the confusable sets
over Fq and Zn is given, i.e., the confusable sets in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are complete (a
simple consequence of the confusable sets definition - closure property under multiplication), the
algorithmic aspect of the expand-and-randomize scheme over Fq and Zn is wide open, i.e., we
do not have efficient algorithms that can help us quickly identify (minimal) feasible expanded
functions. The solutions to current examples are mainly found through the lists of confusable sets
in the Appendix. Going beyond the finite field and the ring of integers modulo n, it is interesting
to explore other widely studied algebraic objects in abstract algebra [23], e.g., the matrix ring
and the polynomial ring. Generally speaking, the expand-and-randomize scheme captures the
idea of embedding the function to compute in another function that guarantees security. The
potential of this general embedding theme remains to be fully explored. Finally, we note that
while we focus on the basic model of minimal (non-interactive three-user) secure computation, the
proposed scheme generalizes immediately to interactive protocols (by first interactively generating
the common randomness) and to more users (the notions of expanded functions generalize in a
natural manner). Exploration of the proposed scheme to various models of secure computation [41]
is an interesting research avenue.
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6 Appendix
Confusable sets of Fq, q < 20
Field γ ∈ S∗ Confusable Sets S0,S1, · · · g h(x)
F5 {1, 4} {0}, {1, 4}, {2, 3} 2 −
F7 {1, 6} {0}, {1, 6}, {2, 5}, {3, 4} 3 −
{1, 2, 4} {0}, {1, 2, 4}, {3, 5, 6}
F32 {1, 2} {0}, {1, 2}, {x, 2x}, {x+ 2, 2x+ 1}, {x+ 1, 2x+ 2} x x2 + x+ 2
{1, 2, x+ 2, 2x+ 1} {0}, {1, 2, x+ 2, 2x+ 1}, {x, 2x, x+ 1, 2x+ 2}
F11 {1, 10} {0}, {1, 10}, {2, 9}, {3, 8}, {4, 7}, {5, 6} 2 −
{1, 3, 4, 5, 9} {0}, {1, 3, 4, 5, 9}, {2, 6, 7, 8, 10}
F13 {1, 12} {0}, {1, 12}, {2, 11}, {3, 10}, {4, 9}, {5, 8}, {6, 7} 2 −
{1, 3, 9} {0}, {1, 3, 9}, {2, 5, 6}, {4, 10, 12}, {7, 8, 11}
{1, 5, 8, 12} {0}, {1, 5, 8, 12}, {2, 3, 10, 11}, {4, 6, 7, 9}
{1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12} {0}, {1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12}, {2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11}
F24 {1, x2 + x, x2 + x+ 1} {0}, {1, x2 + x, x2 + x+ 1}, {x, x3 + x2, x3 + x2 + x}, x x4 + x+ 1
{x+ 1, x3 + 1, x3 + x}, {x2, x3 + x+ 1, x3 + x2 + x+ 1},
{x2 + 1, x3, x3 + x2 + 1}
{1, x3, x3 + x, x3 + x2, {0}, {1, x3, x3 + x, x3 + x2, x3 + x2 + x+ 1},
x3 + x2 + x+ 1} {x, x+ 1, x2 + x+ 1, x3 + x+ 1, x3 + x2 + 1},
{x2, x2 + 1, x2 + x, x3 + 1, x3 + x2 + x}
F17 {1, 16} {0}, {1, 16}, {2, 15}, {3, 14}, {4, 13} 3 −
{5, 12}, {6, 11}, {7, 10}, {8, 9}
{1, 4, 13, 16} {0}, {1, 4, 13, 16}, {2, 8, 9, 15}, {3, 5, 12, 14}, {6, 7, 10, 11}
{1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16} {0}, {1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16}, {3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14}
F19 {1, 18} {0}, {1, 18}, {2, 17}, {3, 16}, {4, 15}, 2 −
{5, 14}, {6, 13}, {7, 12}, {8, 11}, {9, 10}
{1, 7, 11} {0}, {1, 7, 11}, {2, 3, 14}, {4, 6, 9},
{5, 16, 17}, {8, 12, 18}, {10, 13, 15}
{1, 7, 8, 11, 12, 18} {0}, {1, 7, 8, 11, 12, 18}, {2, 3, 5, 14, 16, 17}, {4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 15}
{1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 16, 17} {0}, {1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 16, 17}, {2, 3, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18}
For any q, S0 = {0},S1 = S∗ = F×q are always feasible and omitted (e.g., q = 3, 22, 23 only have such confusable sets).
Figure 9: A list of confusable sets for Fq, q < 20. S∗ is the set of elements over which the randomizer γ is
uniformly distributed. g is a primitive element of F×q and h(x) is an irreducible polynomial for Fpn , n > 1.
Confusable sets of Zn, n < 20
We summarize some properties of the subgroup Gn of Z×n using existing results in group theory
and number theory.
• It is established by Gauss that Z×n is cyclic if and only if n ∈ {2, 4, pb, 2pb} where p is an odd
prime and b is a positive integer (see e.g., Theorem 42 of [24]). Z×n can be generated by a
single element g, typically referred to as the primitive root modulo n. After g is found, we
can enumerate all subgroups of Z×n (similar to Theorem 2). There is no analytic formula or
fast algorithm to find the primitive root modulo n in general (see Section 1.4 of [42]).
• For other values of n not covered above, we do not have a full understanding of all the
subgroups of Z×n in general. A useful approach is prime-power decomposition, based on the
Chinese Remainder Theorem (see e.g., Section 7.6 of [23]). Z×n is a direct product of the
groups corresponding to each of its prime power factors, i.e., Z×n = Z×pk11
× Z×
p
k2
2
· · · , where
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Ring γ ∈ Gn Confusable Sets S0,S1, · · ·
Z4 {1, 3} {0}, {1, 3}, {2}
Z6 {1, 5} {0}, {1, 5}, {2, 4}, {3}
Z8 {1, 3} {0}, {1, 3}, {2, 6}, {4}, {5, 7}
{1, 5} {0}, {1, 5}, {2}, {3, 7}, {4}, {6}
{1, 7} {0}, {1, 7}, {2, 6}, {3, 5}, {4}
{1, 3, 5, 7} {0}, {1, 3, 5, 7}, {2, 6}, {4}
Z9 {1, 8} {0}, {1, 8}, {2, 7}, {3, 6}, {4, 5}
{1, 4, 7} {0}, {1, 4, 7}, {2, 5, 8}, {3}, {6}
{1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8} {0}, {1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8}, {3, 6}
Z10 {1, 9} {0}, {1, 9}, {2, 8}, {3, 7}, {4, 6}, {5}
{1, 3, 7, 9} {0}, {1, 3, 7, 9}, {2, 4, 6, 8}, {5}
Z12 {1, 5} {0}, {1, 5}, {2, 10}, {3}, {4, 8}, {6}, {7, 11}, {9}
{1, 7} {0}, {1, 7}, {2}, {3, 9}, {4}, {5, 11}, {6}, {8}, {10}
{1, 11} {0}, {1, 11}, {2, 10}, {3, 9}, {4, 8}, {5, 7}, {6}
{1, 5, 7, 11} {0}, {1, 5, 7, 11}, {2, 10}, {3, 9}, {4, 8}, {6}
Z14 {1, 13} {0}, {1, 13}, {2, 12}, {3, 11}, {4, 10}, {5, 9}, {6, 8}, {7}
{1, 9, 11} {0}, {1, 9, 11}, {2, 4, 8}, {3, 5, 13}, {6, 10, 12}, {7}
{1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13} {0}, {1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13}, {2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12}, {7}
Z15 {1, 4} {0}, {1, 4}, {2, 8}, {3, 12}, {5}, {6, 9}, {7, 13}, {10}, {11, 14}
{1, 11} {0}, {1, 11}, {2, 7}, {3}, {4, 14}, {5, 10}, {6}, {8, 13}, {9}, {12}
{1, 14} {0}, {1, 14}, {2, 13}, {3, 12}, {4, 11}, {5, 10}, {6, 9}, {7, 8}
{1, 2, 4, 8} {0}, {1, 2, 4, 8}, {3, 6, 9, 12}, {5, 10}, {7, 11, 13, 14}
{1, 4, 7, 13} {0}, {1, 4, 7, 13}, {2, 8, 11, 14}, {3, 6, 9, 12}, {5}, {10}
{1, 4, 11, 14} {0}, {1, 4, 11, 14}, {2, 7, 8, 13}, {3, 12}, {5, 10}, {6, 9}
{1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14} {0}, {1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14}, {3, 6, 9, 12}, {5, 10}
Z16 {1, 7} {0}, {1, 7}, {2, 14}, {3, 5}, {4, 12}, {6, 10}, {8}, {9, 15}, {11, 13}
{1, 9} {0}, {1, 9}, {2}, {3, 11}, {4}, {5, 13}, {6}, {7, 15}, {8}, {10}, {12}, {14}
{1, 15} {0}, {1, 15}, {2, 14}, {3, 13}, {4, 12}, {5, 11}, {6, 10}, {7, 9}, {8}
{1, 3, 9, 11} {0}, {1, 3, 9, 11}, {2, 6}, {4, 12}, {5, 7, 13, 15}, {8}, {10, 14}
{1, 5, 9, 13} {0}, {1, 5, 9, 13}, {2, 10}, {3, 7, 11, 15}, {4}, {6, 14}, {8}, {12}
{1, 7, 9, 15} {0}, {1, 7, 9, 15}, {2, 14}, {3, 5, 11, 13}, {4, 12}, {6, 10}, {8}
{1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15} {0}, {1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15}, {2, 6, 10, 14}, {4, 12}, {8}
Z18 {1, 17} {0}, {1, 17}, {2, 16}, {3, 15}, {4, 14}, {5, 13}, {6, 12}, {7, 11}, {8, 10}, {9}
{1, 7, 13} {0}, {1, 7, 13}, {2, 8, 14}, {3}, {4, 10, 16}, {5, 11, 17}, {6}, {9}, {12}, {15}
{1, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17} {0}, {1, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17}, {2, 4, 8, 10, 14, 16}, {3, 15}, {6, 12}, {9}
Figure 10: A list of confusable sets for Zn, n < 20, n is not a prime (prime n has been covered in Fig. 9).
n = pk11 p
k2
2 · · · for distinct primes pi and integers ki. Any product of subgroups is a subgroup
of the product group. However, the reverse argument is not true, i.e., some subgroup of
Z×n cannot be written as a product of subgroups of Zpkii
. To go beyond subgroup products,
we may resort to the fundamental theorem of finite Abelian group (see e.g., Section 5.2
of [23]), which help decompose Z×n to direct groups of Zb (see Theorem 1.4.1 of [42]) and
then the subgroup enumeration problem becomes that of counting the subgroups of a finite
abelian group, where the case of product of 2 groups Zb1 × Zb2 is fully solved and otherwise
open [43–45] (for analytic solutions of some simple cases, see [46]). Finally, the total number
of subgroups of Zn has order O( lognlog logn) [47].
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